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Abstract
This paper investigates dierent reserve issues inspired by the European situation, focusing on
both the moment when reserves are procured and the degree of coordination among Transmission
System Operators (TSOs) in that procurement. We present three scheduling models formulated as
stochastic programs that represent the day-ahead energy market, the reserve procurement, and the
real-time balancing market in a renewable-dominated power system. Two of the proposed models
are inspired by reserve procurement mechanisms currently applied in Europe, where reserves are
committed either before (Model 1) or after (Model 2) the clearing of the day-ahead energy market.
Then, we use as benchmark a third model in which energy and reserve capacity are co-optimized
(Model 3). In all models, we consider the procurement of both conventional and upward/downward
reserves. We also assess the impact of these organizations on market participants' remuneration and
test the impact of cross-border constraints as those applying in the European power system. The case
study is based on the IEEE 24-node RTS, considering the uncertainty in renewable power production
and demand. Our results show that Model 1 is the least ecient market design as it leads to a
misallocation of the available capacity, while Model 2 becomes as ecient as Model 3 when the TSOs
procure reserve in a coordinated way. Finally, a coordinated procurement of reserves reduces the
system operating costs in all models.
Keywords Electricity market design and integration, Reserve procurement, Flexibility services, Stochastic
programming, Renewable power production.
1 Introduction
1.1 The European context and paper motivations
The restructuring of the European electricity markets, started in the 1990s, has deeply changed the orga-
nization and the architecture of this sector. Directive 96/92/EC (rst legislative package)1 was issued by the
European Parliament and the Council to liberalize electricity markets and to create the Internal Electricity Mar-
ket. This directive provided a few basic common principles in order to enforce a minimum market opening, dene
the non-discriminatory access to the grid, establish a transparent competition, and guarantee the demand supply
in a sector that, before that, was vertically integrated and controlled by a sole entity operating in a monopolistic
regime. These goals have been further enhanced by Directive 2003/54/EC (second legislative package)2 that en-
abled new electricity producers to enter in the wholesale markets and gave the possibility to consumers to choose
their own electricity suppliers. Directive 2009/72/EC (third legislative package)3 and the related ENTSO-E Net-
work Codes for electricity4 have been introduced with the aim of creating a single and coordinated European
1Directive 96/92/EC is available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31996L0092&
from=EN
2Directive 2003/54/EC is available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:caeb5f68-61fd-4ea8-
b3b5-00e692b1013c.0004.02/DOC_1&format=PDF
3Directive 2009/72/E is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0072&
from=en
4See ENTSO-E at https://electricity.network-codes.eu/network_codes/
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electricity market. This has as implication the integration of the day-ahead markets and the ancillary services
represented by congestion management, reserve procurement, and balancing markets. The integration of all these
services is becoming more challenging because of the increasing penetration of the intermittent generation tech-
nologies and the dierent organizations of the corresponding markets in the European countries. A fourth energy
package (the so-called Winter package 2016) was introduced in November 2016.5 This text is still at an early
stage in the legal process and is expected to be signicantly modied before it becomes law. However, one can
safely assume that the demand for more coordination will remain.
The current organization of the European electricity market is based on the separation of the energy and the
ancillary services markets. This organization applies in each member state: Power Exchanges (PXs) clear the
day-ahead electricity market taking into account a zonal representation of the network. Transmission System
Operators (TSOs) procure reserve capacity, manage network congestion, and resolve residual imbalances in real
time after an Intraday Market (IM) enables Balancing Responsible Parties (BRP) to manage some of these
balances. This presence of several PXs and TSOs operating at national or subnational level obviously creates
considerable coordination problems. The integration of the European day-ahead electricity markets has now
become a reality thanks to the application of the Price Coupling of Regions (PCR) and the development of the
Flow-Based Market Coupling approach. The PCR eectively coordinates day-ahead prices of energy by pricing
cross-border transmission capacities. The mechanism was developed at the initiative of several PXs but did not
imply (at least so far) much harmonization among the national PXs. The EUPHEMIA algorithm that couples
the regional markets also contributed to take care of national dierences.6
In contrast with the realization of the day-ahead market, the way torwards the coordination of the intraday
and the ancillary services markets remains long. A comprehensive study on the design elements of intraday and
real-time markets of six European power markets is presented in Neuho et al. (2015). This paper highlights
the dierent and the common elements in the design of these markets. For instance, as indicated in Section 2.4
of Neuho et al. (2015), countries apply dierent rules for dierent reserve categories and may thus mandate
dierent actors to procure the reserve. The dierences appear in the reserve pricing structure, in the approach
adopted for reserve pooling and procurement. In most of the European countries, reserves are procured by TSO
monthly or even annually in advance their deployment as it happens, for example, in Belgium or in the Netherlands.
Only few countries, like Italy or Spain, procure ancillary services once the day-ahead energy market is cleared. As
observed by Baldick,7 the preference by TSOs to procure reserves in advance is likely a manifestation of concerns
about making sure there are enough reserves on the day. However, ceteris paribus, the capacity for reserves will
not change just because it is procured a week or a month in advance. Moreover, contracting monthly or yearly
imposes a much greater risk that there will be outages between the time of contracting and the operating day. This
reserve procurement mechanism was ecient in the past when power systems were mainly based on conventional
technologies. However, the current conguration of the generation mix with a high share of wind and solar power
makes electricity markets more unstable due to the stochasticity of renewable energy sources. In this context,
a reserve allocation operated closer to real time and accounting for updated market information may be more
ecient. The European Commission has recognized this in Article 32, Paragraph 2, item (b) of the guideline
on Electricity Balancing, adopted on 23 November 2017 (see Commission Regulation, 2017b), where it is clearly
stated that the procurement process shall be performed on a short-term basis to the extent possible and where
economically ecient. This is the reason why we try to develop a methodology for comparing the impact of a
commitment of capacity to reserve taking place before and separately from the clearing of the day-ahead energy
market to one where reserve capacity is selected after day-ahead clearing through an arbitrage with the capacity
used for energy generation. This latter approach, which is eectively taking place in some European systems,
is inspired by the joint procurement of energy and reserve in day-ahead operated by an Independent System
Operator (ISO) in the US electricity markets. In addition, considering the decarbonization targets imposed by
the European Commission through the Energy Roadmap 2050 (see European Commission, 2011) and the Winter
package, which imply an increasing penetration of renewable sources in the electricity generation, the timing when
reserves are procured may become important when reserve needs increase.
The European Commission has eectively recognized the importance of a coordinated procurement of reserves
and an integrated balancing mechanism. It is evident that more harmonization is needed to facilitate coordination
but the extent to which this will be achieved remains to be unknown. Several pilot initiatives have been set up at
European level in order to facilitate the implementation of the Electricity Balancing Guideline. Among them, we
recall TERRE (Trans European Replacement Reserve Exchange) and EXPLORE (European X-border project for
Long term Real-time balancing Electricity market design). TERRE is a pilot project for cross-border Replacement
5See the European Commission package Clean Energy for All Europeans available at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/
en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/clean-energy-all-europeans
6See EPEXSPOT at https://www.epexspot.com/en/market-coupling/pcr
7See Baldick R. (2017). Why doesn't the EU co-optimize the procurement of ancillary services with energy? available
at http://fsr.eui.eu/doesnt-eu-co-optimize-procurement-ancillary-services-energy/
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Reserve (RR) exchanges.8 The aim of TERRE is to build an RR platform and to set up the European RR
balancing energy market in order to create a harmonized playing elds for the market participants. It involves
several TSOs, nine of them as participants and the ve others (including ENTSO-E) as observers. The countries
that ocially members of the TERRE project are: France, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland,
Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania (see Nationalgrid et al., 2017).9 In parallel, since the beginning of 2015,
the TSOs of Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands have been studying the possibility of designing a
common mFRR (manual Frequency Restoration Reserve) and aFRR (automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve)10
energy markets in the scope of the requirements of the draft guidelines of electricity balancing. The evolution of
this initial project leads to the realization of two new programs: MARI (Manually Activated Reserves Initiative)
for research on frequency restoration reserve with manual activation (mFRR)11 and PICASSO (Platform for the
International Coordination of the Automatic frequency restoration process and Stable System Operation) for
exploring the integration of automatic frequency restoration reserves (aFRR),12 respectively launched in April
and August, 2017. However, the European countries participating to all these projects have dierent ancillary
services markets, imbalance pricing systems, and reserve procurement mechanisms.
Finally, and just to recall the importance of this internal electricity market objective, Newbery et al. (2016)
evaluate the benets of integrating European electricity markets through the coupling of inter-connectors to
increase the eciency of trading day-ahead, intra-day and balancing services at cross-border level. They estimate
the economic gain of this market coordination at around 3.9 billion e/yr. All this legal activities show that
reserves, their harmonization and the interaction of these reserves in the EU system may become a key issue for
the European electricity market.
In this paper, we explore how reserve procurement in the European electricity market may suers from both
improper market design in individual countries (when the reserve procurement and energy market clearing take
place at dierent times) and the interaction between the coordination of reserve procurement and the already
coordinated day-ahead market. In doing this, we also take into account the uncertainty related to demand and
renewable energy penetration.
1.2 Literature review
Numerous papers can be found in the technical literature addressing the issue of reserve requirements in power
systems. We describe the most relevant contributions in the following.
Before the massive integration of intermittent renewable sources, the models proposed to determine the reserve
capacity needs took into account the security requirements, as presented in Bouard et al. (2005) and Wong and
Fuller (2007). However, the increasing integration of renewable sources for the electricity generation has obliged
to develop new mechanisms to optimally schedule energy and reserve capacity while ensuring the economical
sustainability of the system.
The following papers deal with determining the reserve capacity needed to counteract the wind power uncer-
tainty. Doherty and O'Malley (2005) propose a methodology to evaluate the reserve needs based on a probabilis-
tic approach that takes into account the load and wind forecast errors and the probability of generator outages.
Ortega-Vazquez and Kirschen (2009) conclude that the reserve requirements do not need to be signicantly higher
in power systems with high wind capacity. Papavasiliou et al. (2011) propose a scenario reduction technique on
wind scenarios to determine the reserve requirements. In our paper, we consider the methods presented in Ortega-
Vazquez and Kirschen (2009) to determine the reserve capacity needs. However, dierently from Ortega-Vazquez
and Kirschen (2009) and the aforementioned papers, we focus more on the economic outcome of dierent reserve
procurement mechanisms currently applied in Europe.
In order to simplify our analysis, we refer to stochastic programming theory (see Birge and Louveaux, 1997)
and we systematically assume that the clearing of the day-ahead energy and real-time balancing markets can be
represented by stochastic programming models that link the two markets. This approach, where day ahead is the
rst stage and real time balancing is the second stage, has been widely used in the technical literature (see Conejo
et al., 2010) because it represents a useful stylized paradigm, even though it is implemented neither in the US nor
in Europe. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst one that use stochastic programming to compare
the eciency of several market designs that dier for the mechanism adopted to schedule and procure reserves in
renewable-dominated power systems. Other papers in the literature use two-stage stochastic programming models
to investigate electricity markets in the presence of renewable energy sources penetration, such as Pritchard et al.
(2010), Morales et al. (2012), and Zavala et al. (2017), but with dierent purposes. More precisely, the rst two
8Replacement Reserves, in the new EU terminology, correspond to tertiary reserves in line with the Guideline on
Electricity Balancing. See Commission Regulation (2017a).
9More details are available at https://www.entsoe.eu/network_codes/eb/terre/#consultations
10mFRR and aFRR, in the new EU terminology, correspond to the secondary reserves.
11For more details see https://www.entsoe.eu/network_codes/eb/mari/
12For more details see https://www.entsoe.eu/network_codes/eb/picasso/
3
works address the problem of revenue adequacy and show that this is, in expectation, guaranteed in energy-only
and energy and reserve co-optimization markets when the uncertainty of the wind power production is considered.
They also highlight that, even though this is a general result, some exceptions are possibile, depending on the
realizations of the uncertain parameters. On the other side, Zavala et al. (2017) prove that their formulation leads
to bounded price distortions, zero uplifts in expectation, and day-ahead quantities similar to the corresponding
real-time ones. In addition, as proved by Morales and Pineda (2017), the so-called arbitrage free property of
nance is violated in this market representation. Note that this analysis is out of the scope of our paper.
Considering some applications to the European electricity market, we recall the following papers. Gebrekiros
et al. (2015) present a reserve procurement approach comprising three decision stages: rst, reserve providers
determine their oers based on an opportunity cost method; second, the TSO sorts the oers under a merit order
rule and determines the accepted ones; third, the day-ahead market is cleared considering the reserve capacity
already scheduled. As a dierence with our proposal, in this approach the balancing market is not considered, no
economic analysis of the market participants is carried out, and no transmission capacity limits are considered.
Delikaraoglou et al. (2016) propose stochastic equilibrium problems to study the eects of dierent levels of
spatio-temporal coordination in the clearing of regional electricity markets with signicant stochastic generation.
The results obtained from an illustrative numerical example show how much the social welfare reduces when there
is lack of coordination. However, in this model no inter-temporal constraints are included (as, instead, we do
consider) and the only uncertain parameter is the wind production.
Finally, Van den Bergh et al. (2017) investigate the value of inter-zonal coordination of reserve sizing, allo-
cation and activation in the Central Western European electricity system. First, the zonal reserve requirements
are determined as a function of the probabilistic density function of the wind and solar power forecast errors
through a deterministic problem. Second, a unit commitment day-ahead energy market is solved considering the
reserve capacity already xed. Third, a real-time operating model is solved considering perfect information. No
interchange capacity limitations are considered at the reserve sizing stage. Through the case study, they compare
the costs obtained from dierent levels of coordination. In our proposal, we complete these analysis by comparing
three market designs, i.e. co-optimization and no co-optimization of energy and reserve schedule and reserve
scheduling before and after the day-ahead energy market.
1.3 Paper objectives and contributions
This paper deals with reserve procurement mechanisms in power systems with high renewable capacity and
focuses on the following aspects:
1. The impact of the moment when reserves are scheduled;
2. The impact of the joint procurement of energy and reserves (co-optimization in the US parlance);
3. The eects of a geographically coordinated reserve procurement.
In order to assess the rst item, we start by considering the market design applied in most of the European
countries: energy and ancillary services markets are separated and reserves are scheduled before the clearing of
the day-ahead energy market. We then compare this market conguration with another one also implemented
in Europe, where day-ahead energy and ancillary services markets are still separated in day ahead, but reserves
are committed after the clearing of the day-ahead energy market by arbitraging their value with the one of the
capacity committed in the day-ahead energy market. This obviously implies a revision of the commitment of
the capacities for the energy market and some compensation because of that revision. This alternative market
organization is inspired by the Italian electricity system where the TSO operates the ancillary services market,
after the clearing of the day-ahead market, following a central dispatch approach that co-optimizes the re-dispatch,
the reserve procurement, and the energy balancing.13 This process is aected by a very specic restriction: the
re-dispatching activities conducted by the TSO are constrained to maintain the net commercial transactions
between zones as determined in the clearing of the day-ahead energy market. In other words, the cross-border
ows among zones cannot be modied from those obtained in the day-ahead energy market by PXs. It reects the
importance given to the day-ahead market in the European organization, where the real time is a technical market
aimed at keeping the day-ahead outcome feasible. This view is probably best expressed in Article 3, Paragraph
2, item (e) of the Balancing Electricity Guideline (see Commission Regulation, 2017b).14 This movement towards
co-optimization in the Italian ancillary services market could suggest a possible future evolution of the European
13See the grid code published by Terna, the Italian TSO, at http://www.terna.it/en-gb/sistemaelettrico/
codicedirete.aspx
14Article 3, Paragraph 2, item (e) of the guideline on Electricity Balancing states that ...relevant regulatory authorities
and systems operators shall: ... (e) ensure that the development of the forward, day ahead and intraday markets are not
compromised.
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electricity market; it indeed accomplishes the requisites of Article 32 of the guideline on Electricity Balancing
stating that reserve procurement shall be performed close to real time.15
This implicit recourse to co-optimization in the comparison of the ex-ante and ex-post (with respect to day
ahead) commitment of reserve suggests a third model where capacities are simultaneously committed to energy
and reserve. This is directly inspired by the US market design. The combination of these three dierent market
designs (ex-ante, ex-post, and simultaneous commitment) provides the basis for the analysis of the second item.
On the other side, the third item deals with the standard problem of coordination of policies among dierent
zones. We compare the three aforementioned market congurations, assuming that the procurement of reserve is
done in autarky in dierent zones or integrated among these zones. This is done by decomposing a IEEE problem
in dierent zones and applying the three market designs on these two situations.
Therefore, the contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) We propose stylized models of two market designs currently implemented in European power systems to
schedule energy and reserve capacity that dier from the time in which reserve capacity needs are procured.
Additionally, we compare these European market designs with the joint procurement of energy and reserves
applied in the US. In all models, we consider a zonal reserve procurement and the uncertainty related to the
renewable power production and the demand.
2) We analyze and compare the numerical results obtained from the three models considering two aspects:
the timing of the reserve procurement and dierent levels of TSO coordination in the reserve procurement.
3) In addition, we provide some insights on the application of these dierent designs on the incomes of the
market players. The innovative aspect is that we use the duality principles of linear programming to compute
the consumers' benet, the ISO/TSOs' remuneration, and the generating units' prots. In the generating units'
prots we separate between those resulting from providing energy and reserve capacity, and those related to
ramping exibility services.
4) Our analysis shows the important impact of the market design and the lack of coordination on the e-
ciency and sustainability of power systems. The numerical analysis highlights how choices of market designs and
idiosyncratic constraints (inspired by existing EU practices) can result in unnecessary costs and unserved demand.
This outcome is obtained notwithstanding the optimistic assumptions made on several aspects of the market.
1.4 Paper structure
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the assumptions underpinning the three
models as well as their mathematical formulations. Section 3 describes the input data of the case study, while the
obtained results are analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with some nal remarks. Additional material is
reported in the appendices. In particular, A reports the notation used in the models, while B explains the method
for computing the market players' benets. C and D provide a detailed description of the input data used in the
case study and of the scenario generation, respectively.
2 Model description
We present three models that embed a day-ahead energy market, the reserve procurement (before or after the
day-ahead market), and a balancing market. The latter is cleared after the revelation of renewable generation
and demand. In all models, we account for perfect competition, namely all market players are price takers. In
this section, the common assumptions considered to model the market designs under study and the proposed
formulations are provided.
2.1 Common assumptions
The common assumptions are listed below:
1) Spatial granularity of the markets. In order to facilitate the comparison of the results, we adopt the
same nodal granularity both in the day-ahead and in the balancing markets in all models. The nodal system is in
force in the US, but not in Europe. Assuming nodal pricing everywhere eliminates any discussion of idiosyncratic
congestion eect and enables concentrating on the reserve issue.
2) Spatial granularity of reserve procurement. Reserves are procured on a zonal basis. For this reason,
nodes are grouped into zones that are interpreted as, for instance, the countries in the European electricity market.
This holds for all considered models.
15Article 32, Paragraph 2, item (b) of the guideline on Electricity Balancing indicates that the procurement process shall
be performed on a short-term basis to the extent possible and where economically ecient;
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3) Degree of coordination in reserve procurement. We assume two situations: independent operation
of regional TSOs, and an upper organization of TSOs, namely CORESO,16 that can globally operate the reserve
procurement and the balancing market. In our analysis, we refer to a Coordinated reserve procurement when
this supranational TSO procures reserves and dispatches the balancing market, while Not-coordinated reserve
procurement refers to the situation where TSOs work in an independent way.
4) Reserve types. We consider conventional and upward/downward reserves. In order to make the three
models comparable, we impose a minimum level of upward and downward reserve capacity in each hour. We
provide more details on reserves in Section 2.2.
5) Generating units. Power units are subdivided into dispatchable (nuclear, coal, combined cycle gas
turbine (CCGT)) and stochastic (wind and solar photovoltaic (PV)) units. The proposed models are constructed
over a multi-period horizon and include inter-temporal (ramping) constraints on dispatchable units. Dispatchable
units are further classied into qualied and not-qualied depending on whether they can provide reserves or not.
The criterium to be eligible for reserves diers among the power systems. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that coal and CCGT power plants are qualied units and provide reserves. To avoid non-linearities, we do not
include unit commitment variables. As to stochastic units, we consider that their oers in day ahead are limited
to their capacity. Power spillage is allowed in real time to maintain the system feasibility.
6) Unserved demand. The models contain representations of demand curtailment both in day-ahead and
in real-time markets. Demand curtailment arises when generation does not suce to cover the total demand of
electricity (unserved demand).
7) Demand Side Management (DSM). We also consider DSM in our models, as an additional reserve
service that demand can provide in the balancing market upon request of the TSO. This is done by increasing
or decreasing consumer's demand compared to day-ahead announcement, subject to a deviation margin that is
supposed to be relatively low in comparison with the predicted consumption. We consider that the demand
deviation cost is higher than that of deploying upward reserve by qualied units. Moreover, the unserved demand
cost is assumed to be signicantly higher than the demand deviation cost in DSM so that there will be involuntary
unserved demand only in exceptional situations.
8) Uncertainty. Demand level and renewable power production are the uncertain parameters and their
values are represented by a set of scenarios. A scenario species the demand level and the available wind and
solar power in each hour and in each node of the network. The construction of scenarios is described in Appendix
D (see Supplementary Material).
9) Balancing market. As stated in Section 1.2, we assume that balancing market is perfectly coordinated
in all models and under all reserve coordination assumptions.
2.2 Reserve types and classication
Primary, secondary and tertiary controls are used to restore the balance between generation and load whenever
disturbed. The primary reserve has to the role of stabilizing the system frequency and has to respond to frequency
signals in a short notice, typically within 5-10 seconds. It can ramp up to its full output in 30-60 seconds. After
primary control stabilizes the frequency, it is replaced by secondary control that relieves the primary reserves so
that they can return to their normal condition. The secondary reserves are automatically controlled by the system
operator and must usually respond in 30 seconds. After the frequency has been completely restored, tertiary
reserves are meant to free up secondary reserves, to make the system able to respond to the next contingency.
The operation mode is manually and it typically needs to respond in 15 minutes.
Depending on the considered market, this reserve classication is identied in dierent ways. Table 1 shows
the nomenclature currently adopted in the US (see Chen et al., 2014; Cramton, 2017; Ela et al. 2011 and Flores-
Espino, 2016) and the European (Commission Regulation, 2017a) markets and the respective correspondences
(see Baldick, 2017).
Reserve classication Activation time US reserve classication EU reserve classication
Primary Reserves up to 30 s Regulating Reserves Frequency Containment
Reserves (FCR)
Secondary Reserves from 30 s to 15 m Spinning Contingency Reserves automatic Frequency
Restoration Reserves (aFRR)
Tertiary Reserves from 15 m to 120 m Non-spinning or Supplemental Replacement Reserves (RR)
Contingency Reserves
Table 1: Reserve classications
16See http://www.coreso.eu/
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In our analysis, we assume that reserves are split into upward/downward and conventional reserves. Up-
ward/downward reserves are used to counteract the real time deviations due to forecast errors in the demand and
the renewable stochastic production. Conventional reserves respond to contingencies and are ruled by a standard
N-1 criterion in day ahead, even though we assume no contingency event in the real time operation. Considering
the European jargon, our upward/downward reserves correspond to the automatic frequency restoration reserves,
while what we denote as conventional reserves represent the replacement reserves.
We assume that both types of reserves are zonally procured by TSOs/CORESO on a hourly basis in order to
ensure the reliability of the system (this type of reserves is dened as ramping reserve in Milligan et al., 2010).
The zones are dened according to the area controlled by each TSO. Flexible dispatchable units such as coal and
CCGT units provide this reserve capacity. We assume that oine CCGT and coal units can provide upward and
conventional reserve capacity. Their power output is limited by their ramp capability. Following AREVA T&D
Technology Centre (2006) and the discussion in Ortega-Vazquez and Kirschen (2009), we assume that upward
and downward reserves are determined as a function of the standard deviation of the forecast error distributions
of both the demand level and the stochastic production. Note that the forecast errors are observed in real time,
and hence, in our models are associated with the real-time scenarios. This approach is comparable to those used
by the TSOs in reality (see Milligan et al., 2010). Finally, we do not consider a direct cost for scheduling reserve
capacity in day ahead. The cost of providing reserve services is evaluated in the balancing market in terms of the
energy supplied to counteract deviations.
2.3 Model formulations
This section provides the mathematical formulations of the proposed models. The symbols used in the following
formulations are described in Appendix A.
2.3.1 Model 1: Reserves scheduled before the day-ahead energy market
Model 1 is inspired by some common features of various European market designs of Central-Western Europe,
where TSOs procure reserves, oered by qualied units, before the PXs clear the day-ahead energy markets
(Neuho et al., 2015). Note that, in the European context, national PXs co-exist with PCR that plays the role of
a central clearing house. Afterwords, the PXs/PCR clears the day-ahead energy market to which qualied units
participate, but their bids are restricted to the part of the capacity that has not been committed as reserves.
















































Figure 1: Decision-making process of Model 1
This market conguration is translated into a three-stage stochastic model that is structured as follows: reserve
procurement takes place in the rst stage (e.g. one week ahead or D-7); in the second stage, the day-ahead energy
market clears on the basis of demand and renewable production forecasts (D-1); and the balancing market,
which is the third stage, takes place in real time (D) on the basis of renewable and demand realizations. Since
upward/downward reserves are committed before renewable production and demand forecasts are revealed (e.g.
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in D-7), the TSOs determine the minimum reserve capacity on the basis of the largest possible reserve that can be
required given the renewable production and the demand forecasts. In other words, reserve procurement is based
on the worst realization of demand level and stochastic unit production. Obviously, qualied units committed to
provide reserves in D-7 can bid energy in D-1 only up to their residual capacity. The decision-making process is
depicted in Figure 1.
The PXs/PCR and the TSOs/CORESO operate the energy, the reserve and the balancing markets by mini-






























































































pLDAltf = 0, ∀n,∀t,∀f (λDAntf ) (5)
pLDAltf = Bl(θ
DA
O(l),tf − θDAD(l),tf ), ∀l,∀t, ∀f (ρpltf ) (6)
− PLmaxl ≤ pLDAltf ≤ PLmaxl , ∀l,∀t, ∀f (ρminltf , ρmaxltf ) (7)
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ntf ) (8)
θDAntf = 0, n = ref, ∀t,∀f (ρ0ntf ) (9)
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DA
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gt)− (pDAg,t−1,f −RDg,t−1) ≤ rampupg , ∀g ∈ Ω





g,t−1)− (pDAgtf −RDgt) ≤ rampdog , ∀g ∈ Ω
Q, ∀t,∀f (κrDgtf ) (17)∑
g∈{G(g,n),ΩQ}
(rUgts − rDgts) +
∑
g∈{G(g,n),ΩSt}










(pLRTlts − pLDAltf ) +
∑
l|D(l)=n
(pLRTlts − pLDAltf ) = 0, ∀n,∀t,∀f,∀s ∈ Ωf (λRTnts) (18)
pLRTlts = Bl(θ
RT
O(l),ts − θRTD(l),ts), ∀l,∀t, ∀s (γplts) (19)
− PLmaxl ≤ pLRTlts ≤ PLmaxl , ∀l,∀t,∀s (γminlts , γmaxlts ) (20)
− π ≤ θRTnts ≤ π, ∀n,∀t, ∀s (γπ,minnts , γ
π,max
nts ) (21)
θRTnts = 0, n = ref, ∀t, ∀s (γ0nts) (22)
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0 ≤ rUgts ≤ RUgt, ∀g ∈ ΩQ,∀t, ∀s (δUgts) (23)
0 ≤ rDgts ≤ RDgt, ∀g ∈ ΩQ, ∀t, ∀s (δDgts) (24)
0 ≤ pGgts ≤ PRTgts , ∀g ∈ ΩSt, ∀t,∀s (τgts) (25)
DRTjts + ∆d
U
jts −∆dDjts − dUS
RT
jts ≥ 0, ∀j, ∀t, ∀s (ψ1jts) (26)
0 ≤ ∆dUjts ≤ ∆dmaxjt , ∀j, ∀t,∀s (ψ2jts) (27)
0 ≤ ∆dDjts ≤ ∆dmaxjt , ∀j, ∀t,∀s (ψ3jts) (28)
The objective function (1) represents the total expected cost of operating the power system which has to
be minimized. The rst line of expression (1) represents the total expected cost of scheduling energy in the
day-ahead market and the cost of the possible unserved demand for the set of day-ahead forecasts. The second
line corresponds to the expected (net) cost of the reserves deployed by qualied units in real time. The last line
represents the expected cost of the DSM and the unserved demand in the balancing market.
Constraints (2)-(4) refer to a week ahead (rst stage), constraints (5)-(17) describe the day-ahead energy
market (second stage), while (18)-(28) represent the real-time constraints (third stage).
In particular, constraints (2)-(4) impose the minimum zonal reserve needs in each period one week ahead.
Specically, constraints (2)-(3) enforce the upward/downward reserve requirements on the basis of the maximal
standard deviation of the error distributions in the real-time scenarios in each day-ahead forecast. Parameters σDjt
and σStgt are the standard deviations of the distribution of the forecast error of real-time scenarios, while K
D and
KU are security factors accounting for the spanning time between the predictions and the actual realization (see
Ortega-Vazquez and Kirschen, 2009). Constraint (4) enforces the zonal scheduling of reserve capacity for dealing
with contingencies.
The energy balance in the day-ahead energy market (second stage) is dened through (5) per each node,
forecast, and period. Constraints (6)-(9) dene the power ow through transmission lines in the day-ahead market
and enforce the capacity limits of the lines. Constraint (9) set the voltage angle to zero in the reference node
(n = ref). Constraint (10) limits the unserved demand to the forecast demand in each period. Constraint (11)
limit the power output of not-qualied and stochastic units, while constraints (12)-(13) dene the ramping limits
of not-qualied units. Constraints (14)-(17) enforce capacity and ramping limits of qualied units considering the
scheduled upward/downward and conventional reserves. Ramping constraints of qualied units are imposed on
the reserve capacities (day-ahead market) to take into account the share of capacity used to meet the conventional
reserve requirement, even though we assume that there is no contingency in the real-time operation. The idea is
to have a surrogate of ramping products such as those found in US markets, following the principle that the day-
ahead market should plan for ramping requirements to some extent. This is done by using two sets of constraints:
rst, constraints (2) and (3) model the hourly reserve requirement related to the uncertain parameters (renewable
energy production and demand); second, constraints (16) and (17) derive from cross-period requirements. These
constraints do not add up: the reserve requirement must satisfy constraints that represent two views, but the
model determines which constraints are binding.
Finally, constraints (18)-(28) dene the operation of the balancing market. Constraint (18) represents the
real-time energy balances in each node, each period, each day-ahead forecast scenario, and each real-time scenario
generated from that day-ahead forecast scenario. At this stage, reserves are deployed to counteract the forecast
errors of demand and renewable production respect to the day-ahead schedule. Constraints (19)-(22) limit the
power ow through transmission lines in the same way as in the day-ahead market. Constraints (23) and (24)
limit the deployed upward and downward reserves to what scheduled in day ahead. Constraint (25) limits the
power generated in real time by wind/solar units as a function of the actual available power in each scenario. This
constraint implicitly allows for wind spillage. Constraints (26)-(28) impose limits to the upward and downward
DSM considering the actual demand level in each node, period, and scenario.
2.3.2 Model 2: Reserves scheduled after the day-ahead energy market
Model 2 describes a market where reserve needs are determined by the TSOs after the clearing of the day-
ahead energy market, as for the Italian electricity market. Model 2 is formulated via two optimization problems
that describe the PXs/PCR and TSOs/CORESO's activities, respectively. Figure 2 depicts the decision-making
process adopted in this market design.
First, the PXs/PCR clears the day-ahead energy market without any consideration for reserve requirements.
This is modeled through a deterministic problem and represents a simplied version of EUPHEMIA, which clears
the energy market without considering reserve constraints (or by considering them in some way that is not dened).
All dispatchable units participate to this market and qualied units have no bidding limit.
9





























































Figure 2: Decision-making process of Model 2
After the closure of the day-ahead energy market, the PXs/PCR communicates the obtained schedules for
generating units and the cross-border ows to the TSOs/CORESO, which conducts the second process. In this
second process, the TSOs/CORESO redenes the scheduling of qualied and not-qualied units (if needed) coming
from the day-ahead energy market in order to satisfy the reserve requirements. Therefore, we assume that the
TSOs/CORESO has the possibility to completely re-dispatch generating units. This second process is modeled
through a two-stage stochastic program, in which the rst stage represents the day-ahead rescheduling operated
by the TSOs/CORESO, and the second stage represents the balancing market. The rationale for adopting this
representation is that it corresponds to a real situation inside some European electricity markets: EUPHEMIA
solves a pure day-ahead energy market without considering an endogenisation of reserve and then the TSOs
procure reserve needs. Since the TSOs/CORESO operation takes place after the clearing of the day-ahead energy
market, one could argue that an updated set of forecast scenarios is available to TSOs/CORESO compared to those
used in day-ahead. This is what happens in the reality. However, in order to make results strictly comparable
among all models, we neglect this aspect and assume that the same scenarios are available to PXs/PCR and
TSOs/CORESO.
Moreover, as explained in Section 1.3, the re-dispatching activities conducted by the TSOs/CORESO are
constrained to maintain the net commercial transactions between zones determined in the clearing of the day-
ahead energy market. This requirement is added to the TSOs/CORESO's model. Note that this may be a
challenge in the future. Suppose for a moment a perfect coordination in the reserve procurement within the
market design represented in this Model 2. A direct consequence of this organization is that the TSOs/CORESO
either modies the day-ahead outcome to conduct balancing or operates balancing in some sort of counter-trading
model in order to keep day-ahead transactions unchanged. The mathematical formulations of the problems
describing this market organization are provided below.
2.3.2.1 PXs/PCR: day-ahead energy market
This model represents the day-ahead energy market cleared by the PXs/PCR, which seeks to minimize the costs































pLDAlt = 0, ∀n,∀t (λDAnt ) (30)
10
0 ≤ pDAgt ≤ PFg , ∀g ∈ ΩSt, ∀t, (µStgt) (31)
0 ≤ pDAgt ≤ PGmaxgt , ∀g ∈ ΩDi,∀t, (µgt) (32)
pDAgt − pDAg,t−1 ≤ rampupg , ∀g ∈ Ω
Di, ∀t (κ1gt) (33)
pDAg,t−1 − pDAgt ≤ rampdog , ∀g ∈ Ω
Di, ∀h (κ2gt) (34)
pLDAlt = Bl(θ
DA
O(l),t − θDAD(l),t, ∀l,∀t (ρplt) (35)
− PLmaxl ≤ pLDAlt ≤ PLmaxl , ∀l,∀t (ρminlt , ρmaxlt ) (36)
− π ≤ θDAnt ≤ π, ∀n,∀t (ρπ,minnt , ρ
π,max
nt ) (37)
θDAnt = 0, n = ref, ∀t (ρ0nt) (38)
0 ≤ dUS
DA
jt ≤ DFjt, ∀j, ∀t (ψjt) (39)
Constraint (30) represents the energy balance. We assume that the power scheduled by renewable generating
units is restricted by the corresponding forecasts as indicated in constraint (31). Constraints (32)-(34) indicate
the production capacity and the ramping limits imposed on dispatchable units. In this model, capacity represents
the unique restriction imposed on the bids submitted by qualied units in the day-ahead energy market. When
bidding, these units do not have to account for the capacity that could be destined to reserves. It is the task of
the TSOs/CORESO to re-dispatch these units after the closure of the day-ahead energy market and to possibly
re-dene their schedules in order to set the amount of capacity respectively destined to energy production and
reserves. Finally, constraints (35)-(39) are the transmission limits and the cap on unserved demand are dened
as in constraints (6)-(10) of Model 1, but without considering the dependence on forecast scenario f .
2.3.2.2 TSOs/CORESO: ancillary service market
After the closure of the day-ahead energy market, the TSOs/CORESO immediately runs the ancillary services
market. When the TSOs/CORESO starts its activities, it is still D-1.
The objective function (40) is the total expected cost resulting from re-dispatching the dispatctable units and
from operating the real-time balancing market. The rst line of (40) represents the rst stage cost (day ahead)
and comprises the cost of the power re-dispatched by dispatchable units and the unserved demand cost that could
be found at that stage. Parameter pDA∗gt represents the power scheduled by generating unit g in the day-ahead
energy market, being an input data to the TSOs/CORESO's problem. The second and third lines are related to















































































lt ∀z, ∀t (ϕzt) (42)
pLTSOlt = Bl(θ
TSO
O(l),t − θTSOD(l),t), ∀l,∀t (ωplt) (43)
− PLmaxl ≤ pLTSOlt ≤ PLmaxl , ∀l,∀t (ωminlt , ωmaxlt ) (44)
− π ≤ θTSOnt ≤ π, ∀n,∀t, (ωπ,minnt , ω
π,max
nt ) (45)




jt ≤ DFjt, ∀j, ∀t (ψTSOjt ) (47)
0 ≤ pTSOgt ≤ PGmaxg , ∀g ∈ ΩnQ,ΩSt, ∀t (µTSOgt ) (48)
pTSOgt − pTSOg,t−1 ≤ rampupg , ∀g ∈ Ω
nQ, ∀t (µrUgt ) (49)
pTSOg,t−1 − pTSOgt ≤ rampdog , ∀g ∈ Ω





gt ≤ PGmaxg , ∀g ∈ ΩQ, ∀t, (κUgt) (51)





gt)− (pTSOg,t−1 −RDg,t−1) ≤ rampupg , ∀g ∈ Ω





g,t−1)− (pTSOgt −RDgt) ≤ rampdog , ∀g ∈ Ω


























g }, ∀z, ∀t (ηCzt) (57)
∑
g∈{G(g,n),ΩQ}
(rUgts − rDgts) +
∑
g∈{G(g,n),ΩSt}










(pLRTlts − pLTSOlt ) +
∑
l|D(l)=n
(pLRTlts − pLTSOlt ) = 0, ∀n,∀t, ∀s (λRTnts) (58)
Constraints (19)− (28) (59)
Constraints (41)-(57) refer to the day ahead of the TSO's market (rst stage), while constraints (58)-(59)
correspond to real-time operation (second stage). The TSO re-dispatches energy at nodal level, as stated through
(41), but subject to the constraint on net commercial exchanges among zones that have to remain as dened in
clearing of the energy market. This corresponds to condition (42). Constraints (43)-(54) dene the day-ahead
scheduling and are equivalent to constraints (6)-(17) of Model 1, but without considering the dependence of
the day-ahead forecast f . Constraints (55)-(57) impose the minimum zonal reserve needs in each period of the
following day. Particularly, constraints (55) and (56) dene the minimum zonal downward and upward reserve
needs estimated on the basis of the volatility of the forecast errors in the demand and wind/solar production
predictions. Constraint (57) establishes the minimum reserve requirement to solve the possible contingency of
the largest unit. Finally, the energy balance at the real-time operation is dened through (58), while the other
real-time constraints are equivalent to constraints (18)-(28) of Model 1.
2.3.3 Model 3: Energy and reserve needs are jointly scheduled
This model represents the energy and reserve co-optimization applied in the US and it is formulated as a
two-stage stochastic program, where the rst stage describes the day-ahead market and the second stage the
balancing market. Figure 3 depicts the decision-making process considered for this market design.
The objective function (60) is similar to that of Model 1, but in this case there is no dependence on the
day-ahead forecasts f . The minimization of the objective function is subject to day-ahead (61)-(76) and real-time
(77)-(78) constraints. Since the constraints of this model are equivalent to those described in the previous models,
we avoid to include a detailed description for the sake of consciousness.
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pLDAlt = 0, ∀n,∀t (λDAnt ) (61)
pLDAlt = Bl(θ
DA
O(l),t − θDAD(l),t), ∀l,∀t (ρplt) (62)
− PLmaxl ≤ pLDAlt ≤ PLmaxl , ∀l,∀t (ρminlt , ρmaxlt ) (63)
− π ≤ θDAnt ≤ π, ∀n,∀t (ρπ,minnt , ρ
π,max
nt ) (64)
θDAnt = 0, n = ref, ∀t (ρ0nt) (65)
0 ≤ dUS
DA
jt ≤ DFjt, ∀j, ∀t (ψjt) (66)
0 ≤ pDAgt ≤ PGmaxg , ∀g ∈ ΩnQ,ΩSt, ∀t (µgt) (67)
pDAgt − pDAg,t−1 ≤ rampupg , ∀g ∈ Ω
nQ,∀t (µrUgt ) (68)
pDAg,t−1 − pDAgt ≤ rampdog , ∀g ∈ Ω





gt ≤ PGmaxg , ∀g ∈ ΩQ,∀t (κUgt) (70)





gt)− (pDAg,t−1 −RDg,t−1) ≤ rampupg , ∀g ∈ Ω





g,t−1)− (pDAgt −RDgt) ≤ rampdog , ∀g ∈ Ω




























g }, ∀z, ∀t (ηCzt) (76)
∑
g∈{G(g,n),ΩQ}
(rUgts − rDgts) +
∑
g∈{G(g,n),ΩSt}










(pLRTlts − pLDAlt ) +
∑
l|D(l)=n
(pLRTlts − pLDAlt ) = 0, ∀n,∀t,∀s (λRTnts) (77)
Constraints (19)− (28) (78)
3 Case Study: input data and assumptions
This section provides a brief description of the input data used in the case study and additional assumptions
on which our case study is based on. Due to space limitations, the tables reporting the input data related to the
generating units and the transmission system are described in C.
The numerical analysis is conducted on the IEEE 24-node Reliability Test System (RTS).17 We consider an
updated version of the generating system of the RTS, where the renewable capacity represents 47.5% of the total
generating capacity in the system.
We generate day-ahead and real-time scenarios of the uncertain parameters (wind and solar power production
and demand level) as described in D. Specically, we consider 3 scenarios for the day ahead from which we
generate 10 real-time scenarios giving a total of 30 real-time scenarios. Due to the structure of the market, Model
1 has been run considering the 3 day-ahead forecast scenarios and the 30 real-time scenarios all together. However,
Model 2 and Model 3 are run three times, one per each day-ahead forecast and considering the corresponding 10
real-time scenarios of each day-ahead forecast.
As explained in Section 2.1, reserves are procured at zonal level and the minimum capacity requirements
depend on the degree of coordination of the TSOs. The characteristics of the two cases studied in this paper are
the following ones:
1) Three zones case: This envisages the not-coordinated reserve procurement where there is no coor-
dination among the TSOs and hence, reserve needs are independently dened by each TSO in its zone (zonal
representation). We consider the three-zone subdivision in the network as represented in Figure C.7 in C. This
way, the conventional reserve requirement for zones 1, 2 and 3 is 300 MW, 400 MW and 500 MW, respectively,
which corresponds to the capacity of the largest unit located in each zone. Therefore, the total capacity devoted
to conventional reserves has to be, at least, equal to 1200 MW. Note that in Model 2 the constraint on cross-zonal
day-ahead energy ow limitations (42) is enforced. However, as explained in Section 1.3, we assume perfectly co-
ordinated balancing markets in all models, and hence, cross-border constraints are not considered in the real-time
market of Model 2.
2) One zone case: This represents the coordinated reserve procurement, which can be interpreted as a
situation where a single TSO procures reserves for the whole system. The three models are directly adapted by
setting index z equal to 1. In addition, in Model 2 the coordinate reserve procurement implies that the TSO
can operate the ancillary services market without the requirement of maintaining cross-border day-ahead energy
ows, i.e., constraint (42) does not apply in this case. Finally, the conventional reserve requirement in this case
is 500 MW, which corresponds to the capacity of the largest unit of the whole system.
All cases have been solved using CPLEX 12.6.3.0 (http://www.ilog.com/products/cplex/) under GAMS
24.6.1 on a Intel(R) Core(TM) 1.30 GHz processor with 4 GB RAM. Finally, Table 2 reports the computation
time of three models run under the dierent assumptions considered.




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Computation time 28.64 s
Forecast 1 2.13 s Forecast 1 2.19 s
Forecast 2 1.75 s Forecast 2 1.19 s
Forecast 3 1.77 s Forecast 3 1.83 s
One zone
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Computation time 15.15 s
Forecast 1 1.33 s Forecast 1 1.31 s
Forecast 2 1.43 s Forecast 2 1.44 s
Forecast 3 1.36 s Forecast 3 1.36 s
Table 2: Computation time of the dierent models (measured in seconds)
4 General Discussion
The number of considered scenarios may be small and hence our results may look at best illustrative, but they
reect basic economic phenomena. In particular, Model 3 (co-optimization of energy and reserves) is expected
to be more ecient than Models 1 and 2. Model 2 (reserves after the energy market) partially reproduces the
co-optimized procurement of energy and reserves in the ancillary services market. The TSO can correct the
schedule of the day-ahead energy market if necessary by partially discarding its result and conducting an ex-post
co-optimization of energy and reserve. However, the interest of Model 2 is to assess the impact of imposing
the cross-border exchange scheduled in the day-ahead energy market to the ancillary services market in the
zonal representation. Thus, while in the one zone case Model 2 represents a good proxy of the co-optimization
paradigm proposed in Model 3, in the three zones case the imposition of cross-zonal constraints leads to welfare
losses. Finally, Model 1 (reserves before the energy market) is expected to be the farthest from Model 3 in terms
of system costs.
These principles are general even though not always recognized in practice. They are conrmed by the
numerical results that we discuss in the following sections. However, a dedicated analysis would be necessary to
obtain a precise numerical evaluation for the European electricity market.
Furthermore, this analysis suggests some side questions. Flexility is an often mentioned subject in the context
of renewable energy sources. A relevant question is whether one should introduce a special exibility market for
dealing with variable renewable sources (which would require dening exibility services) or whether the exibility
of the existing plants of the system is sucient (in which case a market for exibility would be redundant). This
suggests analyzing results in terms of the following stylized questions:
1. Could it be that the exibility embedded in plant capacity is sucient? This would mean that exibility is
eectively a byproduct of existing capacity and there is no need for a exibility market. We refer to that
situation as to a capacity driven market.
2. In contrast the exibility oered by existing plants could be tight and fully used. This could constraint and
hence modify the merit order, making it necessary to introduce a market for ramping services. We refer to
that situation as to a capacity and exibility driven market.
In this case study, the analysis of the problem is conduced by comparing the autarky and integrated markets.
The results provided in Subsection 5.3 show that from the capacity driven paradigm observed in the coordinated
case, where capacity oers exibility as a byproduct, we move towards a exibility tight market in the not-
coordinated case, where exibility is no longer a byproduct of capacity but it is remunerated on its own. This is
particularly evident for CCGT units, which are mainly used for ramping.
5 Results
This section reports the numerical results obtained from the models under study. Specically, we compare
the following items for the three zones and one zone cases: i) the scheduled reserve capacities and the renewable
power spillage; ii) the system operating costs; iii) the generating units' prots; and iv) the consumers' benets
and the TSOs/CORESO's remuneration.
5.1 Scheduled reserves and renewable power spillage
To allow a better understanding of the economic results obtained from each market structure, we rstly show
how reserves are scheduled and the renewable power spillage in each model. Figure 4 depicts the use of the
CCGT units to provide conventional and upward reserve capacity and energy in the day-ahead market. The
capacity that is not used is also indicated. Comparing the not-coordinated and the coordinated cases, we observe
that the three-zone system requires that the CCGT units provide a comparatively higher conventional reserve
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capacity, which results in lower exibility in the system operation. The more signicant dierences in the reserve
capacity scheduled in each model are found when the power system is in a comparatively exible situation. In the
three-zones case, a comparable more exible situation corresponds to the rst and last hours of the day. Model 1
schedules higher reserve capacity than the other two models. Instead, in the one-zone case, this is more evident in
general because there are no zonal limitations to procure the reserve needs so it makes the system quite exible.
Again, we observe that higher reserve capacity is scheduled in Model 1 with respect to Model 2 and Model 3.
in the coordinated case, where capacity offers flexibility as a byproduct, we move towards a flexibility
tight market in the not-coordinated case, where flexibility is no longer a byproduct of capacity but it is
remunerated on its own. This is particularly evident for CCGT units, which are mainly used for ramping.
5. Results
This section reports the numerical results obtained from the models under study. Specifically, we
compare the following items for the three zones and one zone cases: i) the scheduled reserve capacities
and the renewable power spillage; ii) the system operating costs; iii) the generating units’ profits; and
iv) the consumers’ benefits and the TSOs/CORESO’s remuneration.
5.1. Scheduled reserves and renewable power spillage
To allow a better understanding of the economic results obtained from each market structure, we
firstly show how reserves are scheduled and the renewable power spillage in each model. Figure 4 depicts
the use of the CCGT units to provide conventional and upward reserve capacity and energy in the day-
ahead market. The capacity that is not used is also indicated. Comparing the not-coordinated and
the coordinated cases, we observe that the three-zone system requires that the CCGT units provide
a comparatively higher conventional reserve capacity, which results in lower flexibility in the system
operation. The more significant differences in the reserve capacity scheduled in each model are found
when the power system is in a comparatively flexible situation. In the three-zones case, a comparable
more flexible situ ti n co responds to the first nd last hours of the day. Mo el 1 schedules igher reserve
capacity t an the other two models. Instead, in the ne-zo e c se, this is more vident in general because
ther re no zonal limitati ns to procure the reserve needs so it makes the syst m quite flexible. Aga n,
we observe that higher reserve capacity is schedul in Model 1 with respect to Model 2 and Model 3.
Hour (h)










































































































Figure 4: Use of CCGT units in the day ahead.
Figure 5 shows the wind and solar power spillage in each model and for the not-coordinated and
coordinated cases. As it can be observed, the lack of coordination in the reserve procurement entails a
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Figure 4: Use of T units in the day ahead.
Figure 5 shows the wind and solar power spillage in each model and for the not-coordinated and coordinated
cases. As it n be observed, the lack of coordination in the reserve procur m nt entails a less cient u e of
the renewable power. The reason is that the higher use of CCGT units in providing reserve capacity makes the
system less exible and hence, it becomes more dicult to counteract the variability of the renewable sources.
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less efficient use of the renewable power. The reason is that the higher use of CCGT units in providing
reserve capacity makes the system less flexible and hence, it becomes more difficult to counteract the
variability of the renewable sources.
Hour (h)



































































Figure 5: Wind and solar power spillage in each model and case.
5.2. System’s operating costs
The system daily operating costs in the three models for the two cases are given in Tables 3-5.
Costs are subdivided into “DA energy costs”, “RT operating costs”, and “RT unserved demand value”
that represent the costs associated with the day-ahead energy scheduling, the real-time operating costs,
and the penalization of the involuntary unserved demand, respectively. The real time costs are related
to upward/downward reserve utilization and the DSM services provided by consumers. Tables 4 and 5
report the results obtained for each forecast and the relative expectation. More specifically, in Table 4,
we first illustrate the outcomes of the PXs/PCR and of the TSOs/CORESO problems, separately, and,
then, we put them together to make them comparable with the results of the other two models.
Three zones One zone
Total operating cost 1,388,925 1,097,416
DA energy cost 1,124,847 1,092,812
RT operating cost 24,726 4,604
RT unserved demand value 239,230 0
Table 3: Total system costs ($) in Model 1 (daily values)
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Figure 5: Wind and solar power spillage in each model and case.
5.2 System's operating costs
The system daily operating costs in the three models for the two cases are given in Tables 3-5. Costs are
subdivided into DA energy costs, RT operating costs, and RT unserved demand value that represent the
costs associated with the day-ahead energy scheduling, the real-time operating costs, and the penalization of the
involuntary unserved demand, respectively. The real time costs are related to upward/downward reserve utilization
and the DSM services provided by consumers. Tables 4 and 5 report the results obtained for each forecast and
the relative expectation. More specically, in Table 4, we rst illustrate the outcomes of the PXs/PCR and of
the TSOs/CORESO problems, separately, and, then, we put them together to make them comparable with the
results of the other two models.
otal o er ti ,
energy cost , , , ,
operati g c st , ,
unserve e l ,
Table 3: Total system cos ) in Model 1 (daily values)
Three zones
Forecast 1 Forecast 2 Forecast 3 Expected
PXs DA energy costs 1,062,997 950,675 1,231,596 1,081,756
Total TSOs costs 357,304 117,577 417,898 297,693
TSOs DA re-dispatch costs 24,047 45,829 16,836 28,904
RT operating costs 29,601 24,239 34,834 29,558
RT unserved demand value 303,655 47,808 366,227 239,230
PXs+TSOs
Total operating costs 1,420,301 1,068,553 1,649,493 1,379,349
DA energy costs 1,087,044 996,505 1,248,432 1,110,660
RT operating costs 29,601 24,239 34,834 29,558
RT unserved demand value 303,655 47,808 366,227 239,230
One zone
Forecast 1 Forecast 2 Forecast 3 Expected
PXs DA energy costs 1,062,997 950,675 1,231,596 1,081,756
Total TSOs costs 22,070 15,188 3,879 13,712
TSOs DA re-dispatch costs 7,173 3,988 -5,538 1,874
RT operating costs 14,897 11,200 9,416 11,838
RT unserved demand value 0 0 0 0
PXs+TSOs
Total operating costs 1,085,067 965,864 1,235,474 1,095,468
DA energy costs 1,070,170 954,664 1,226,058 1,083,630
RT operating costs 14,897 11,200 9,416 11,838
RT unserved demand value 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Total system costs ($) in Model 2 (daily values)
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Three zones
Forecast 1 Forecast 2 Forecast 3 Expected
Total operating costs 1,420,301 1,068,253 1,649,007 1,379,187
DA energy costs 1,085,844 995,057 1,247,155 1,109,352
RT operating costs 30,801 25,387 35,625 30,604
RT unserved demand value 303,656 47,809 366,227 239,231
One zone
Forecast 1 Forecast 2 Forecast 3 Expected
Total operating costs 1,085,067 965,864 1,235,474 1,095,468
DA energy costs 1,073,443 949,631 1,231,071 1,084,715
RT operating costs 11,624 16,233 4,403 10,753
RT unserved demand value 0 0 0 0
Table 5: Total system costs ($) in Model 3 (daily values)
The main results of this analysis are as follows. First, the most relevant consequence of the no coordination
in the reserve procurement is the involuntary unserved demand found in the real-time operation (compare, for
instance, the values in the last line of Table 3 between the three zones and one zone cases). The expected unserved
demand in the three zones case is 24 MWh for all models, which occurs in some scenarios due to the reduction
in the available generating capacity as a consequence of the reserve capacity requirements. The segmentation of
the power system into three reliability zones implies a higher requirement of conventional reserves compared to
the coordinated case, going from 500 MW to 1200 MW. These results show the negative eect of operating a
power system with high renewable capacity and no coordination in the procurement of reserve needs. Indeed, the
system operation in reality is much more exible and secure than what our models simulate, but these results
give a quantitative idea of those eects.
Second, the positive value of the real-time operating costs indicates that, in general, the upward reserve is
more frequently deployed than the downward reserve. As we assume that stochastic units can be scheduled up to
their capacity in the day-ahead market, it is less costly for the system to schedule stochastic units in an optimistic
way in the day-ahead energy market and then to deploy upward reserve in the real-time operation when needed.
Third, procuring reserves before the clearing of the day-ahead energy market (Model 1) turns out to be the
least ecient option in both the not-coordinated and coordinated cases. Since the reserve schedule is based on
less information (a distribution of forecast errors instead of a day-ahead forecast), the TSO procures more reserves
than eectively needed by the system. This implies higher total operating costs.
Fourth, Model 2 is not as ecient as Model 3 in the three-zones case. The imposition of the cross-border
constraints in the day ahead of the ancillary services market of Model 2 limits the action of the TSO, which leads
to slightly higher operating costs in Model 2 compared to Model 3. However, looking at the results corresponding
to the one zone case, Model 2 is as ecient as Model 3.
Finally, note that Tables 3-5 report daily values. If this reasoning is translated in annual terms, assuming a
similar variability of the daily scheduling along the year, the impact that the ineciency of Model 1 has in terms
of its extra-costs (money loss) compared to Model 2 and Model 3 may be signicant, as shown in Table 6.
Three zones One zone
Daily Annually Daily Annually
Model 1 vs. Model 2 9,576 3,495,240 1,947 710,655
Model 1 vs. Model 3 9,738 3,554,370 1,947 710,655
Model 2 vs. Model 3 162 59,130 0 0
Table 6: Extra operating costs ($) among models
5.3 Generating units' prots
The generators' prots obtained by each technology in each model in the three-zones and one-zone cases are
reported in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. As explained in B, the prots of the generators come from two sources:
i) the energy and reserve services, and ii) the exibility services, linked to their ramping capability.
In the three zone case, the units' prots are so high because of the eect of the unserved demand registered
in the real-time operation. This eect distorts the results and, for this reason, we analyze in more detail the unit
prots in the coordinated case, where no unserved demand is found.
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Three Zones




Energy and Reserves 2,173,000 2,182,569 2,183,230
Upward ramping 9,389 6,747 6,658
Downward ramping 3,891 5,065 5,154
Total prot 2,186,280 2,194,382 2,195,043
CCGT
Energy and Reserves 5,468,159 5,515,309 5,515,896
Upward ramping 1,116,705 1,092,630 1,091,753
Downward ramping 165,612 146,707 147,400
Total prot 6,750,476 6,754,646 6,755,049
Not-qualied units Nuclear
Energy 2,142,605 2,151,942 2,151,942
Upward ramping 100 100 100
Downward ramping - - -
Total prot 2,142,705 2,152,042 2,152,042
Stochastic units
Wind
Energy 2,312,859 2,336,461 2,336,448
Spillage in RT - - -
Total prot 2,312,859 2,336,461 2,336,448
Solar
Energy 1,370,510 1,375,993 1,375,991
Spillage in RT - - -
Total prot 1,370,510 1,375,993 1,375,991
Table 7: Generating units' prots ($) in the three models in the three zones case (daily values)
One Zone




Energy and Reserves 115,459 115,688 115,688
Upward ramping 121 7 13
Downward ramping 1,460 1,548 1,542
Total prot 117,040 117,243 117,243
CCGT
Energy and Reserves 9,434 9,361 9,361
Upward ramping 3,613 3,277 3,453
Downward ramping 2,278 2,400 2,224
Total prot 15,326 15,038 15,038
Not-qualied units Nuclear
Energy 440,185 441,440 441,440
Upward ramping - - -
Downward ramping - - -
Total prot 440,185 441,440 441,440
Stochastic units
Wind
Energy 818,493 822,260 822,260
Spillage in RT - - -
Total prot 818,493 822,260 822,260
Solar
Energy 241,926 242,205 242,205
Spillage in RT - - -
Total prot 241,926 242,205 242,205
Table 8: Generating units' prots ($) in the three models in the one zone case
As it can be seen in Table 8, the best economic outcomes obtained by the generators result from Model 2
and Model 3, except for the CCGT units. These units provide more reserve capacity in Model 1 and, hence, they
obtain a higher income. Wind units get the best economic outcomes independently of the market organization.
Looking in more details at the qualied units, we observe that coal units, with lower operating costs than
CCGT plants, supply high share of the energy, from where they obtain most of their prots. The remaining
part of their capacity is mainly employed for reserves. Since coal units are online during most of the day, they
provide high downward reserve capacity, as it can be noticed from their downward ramping prots. On the other
hand, the prots obtained by CCGT units are much smaller than the rest of the generators due to their high
operating costs and low participation to the day-ahead energy market. Their prots mainly derive from reserves
commitment and ramping services that are employed to guarantee exibility to the system (note that the amount
of reserves scheduled with CCGT plants is higher than that procured by coal units).
Comparing the results by looking at the level of coordination in the reserve procurement, we observe that
while capacity, as a provider of energy and reserve, is the main source of revenue in the coordinated case, the role
of exibility becomes more important when this coordination disappears (compare Tables 7 and 8).
Figure 6 depicts the expected day-ahead prices resulting from each model in the three-zones and one-zone
cases. The graphs show that the electricity prices in the day-ahead energy market are slightly more stable in
Model 2 than in Models 1 and 3, specially in the three zones case. In this case, the day-ahead energy prices in
Model 1 and Model 3 adopt a very high value in those hours in which there is unserved demand in the real-time
operation, even though there is no unserved demand in the day-ahead market. Assuming that power system
operations are much more exible as what it is represented in the proposed models, the fact that the day-ahead
energy market, where most of the energy is dispatched, does not give signicant dierences among the hourly
prices may be a good feature of the market represented by Model 2.
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As it can be seen in Table 8, the best economic outcomes obtained by the generators result from
Model 2 and Model 3, except for the CCGT units. These units provide more reserve capacity in Model
1 and, hence, they obtain a higher income. Wind units get the best economic outcomes independently of
the market organization.
Looking in more details at the qualified units, we observe that coal units, with lower operating costs
than CCGT plants, supply high share of the energy, from where they obtain most of their profits. The
remaining part of their capacity is mainly employed for reserves. Since coal units are online during most of
the day, they provide high downward reserve capacity, as it can be noticed from their downward ramping
profits. On the other hand, the profits obtained by CCGT units are much smaller than the rest of the
generators due to their high operating costs and low participation to the day-ahead energy market. Their
profits mainly derive from reserves commitment and ramping services that are employed to guarantee
flexibility to the system (note that the amount of reserves scheduled with CCGT plants is higher than
that procured by coal units).
Comparing the results by looking at the level of coordination in the reserve procurement, we observe
that while capacity, as a provider of energy and reserve, is the main source of revenue in the coordinated
case, the role of flexibility becomes more important when this coordination disappears (compare Tables
7 and 8).
Figure 6 depicts the expected day-ahead prices resulting from each model in the three-zones and one-
zone cases. The graphs show that the electricity prices in the day-ahead energy market are slightly more
stable in Model 2 than in Models 1 and 3, specially in the three zones case. In this case, the day-ahead
energy prices in Model 1 and Model 3 adopt a very high value in those hours in which there is unserved
demand in the real-time operation, even though there is no unserved demand in the day-ahead market.
Assuming that power system operations are much more flexible as what it is represented in the proposed
models, the fact that the day-ahead energy market, where most of the energy is dispatched, does not
give significant differences among the hourly prices may be a good feature of the market represented by
Model 2.
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Figure 6: Day-ahead energy prices in each model and case.
5.4. Consumers’ benefit and TSO’s remuneration
Table 9 reports the consumers’ benefit, which accounts for the values of energy services and the
reliability provided by the scheduled reserves. Considering the energy services, we report the consumers’
willingness to pay (“Willingness to pay”), their revenues from DSM services (“Remuneration of DSM
services in RT”), the costs they face for buying electricity in the day-ahead energy market (“Electricity
payment in DA”), and the value of the deviation between the actual demand in real time and the forecast
in day ahead (“Value of demand deviation”). In addition, for Model 2 only, we indicate the re-dispatching
costs, coming from the re-scheduling of the dispatchable units that the TSOs/CORESO imposes on
consumers (see “Re-dispatch costs” in Table 9). In all models, the “Value of demand deviation” represents
a cost that is charged to consumers.
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Figure 6: Day-ahead energy prices in each model and case.
5.4 Consumers' benet and TSO's remuneration
Table 9 reports the consumers' benet, which accounts for the values of energy services and the reliability
provided by the scheduled reserves. Considering the energy services, we report the consumers' willingness to pay
(Willingness to pay), their revenues from DSM services (Remuneration of DSM services in RT), the costs they
face for buying electricity in the d y-ahead energy market (Electricity payment in DA), and the value of he
deviation between the actual demand in real time and the forecast in day ahead (Value of demand deviation). In
addition, for Model 2 only, we indicate the re-dispatching costs, coming from the re-scheduling of the dispatchable
units that the TSOs/CORESO imposes on consumers (see Re-dispatch costs in Table 9). In all models, the
Value of demand deviation represents a cost that is charged to consumers.
Generally, consumers' benet is lower when there is no coordination in reserve procurement. In particular,
in the three zones case, the lowest consumers' benet value is registered in Model 3. Since Model 3 represents
the most ecient market organization among the ones analyzed, the higher benets obtained in Models 1 and
2 must be due to some system ineciencies. However, in Model 2 the sum of the terms Electricity payment in
DA and Re-dispatch costs results to be equal to $12,399,907, which is very close to the electricity payment in
day ahead of Model 3 (it is exactly the same in the coordinated case). Moreover, the cost faced by consumers
for the system reliability in Model 1 is higher than in the other two market paradigms, which is linked with the
reserve procurement.
Three zones
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Expected) (Expected)
Energy services
Willingness to pay 539,122,936 539,122,936 539,122,936
Remuneration of DSM services in RT 471,842 469,464 469,456
Electricity payment in DA 12,353,266 2,780,955 12,401,545
Value of demand deviation 37,441 36,759 36,772
Re-dispatch costs n.a. 9,618,952 n.a.
Reliability Value of the system reliability 4,274,302 4,266,867 4,266,985
Consumers' benet 522,929,769 522,888,867 522,887,090
One zone
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Expected) (Expected)
Energy services
Willingness to pay 539,122,936 539,122,936 539,122,936
Remuneration of DSM services in RT 8 5 5
Electricity payment in DA 2,780,407 2,780,955 2,784,559
Value of demand deviation 962 943 943
Re-dispatch costs n.a. 3,604 n.a.
Reliability Value of the system reliability 583 602 602
Consumers' benet 536,340,992 536,336,837 536,336,837
Table 9: Consumers' benet ($) in the three models (daily values)
The comparison between the three zones and one zone cases shows that the lack of coordination has two
other eects. First, since there is less capacity available to generate electricity due to the higher reserve capacity
requirement, consumers oer high downward reserve service, which implies high revenues for them (the DMS
20
revenues in the coordinated case are almost null). Second, we observe a signicant high value of the system
reliability. Again, having a comparatively tighter power system results in more expensive exibility services.
Finally, Table 10 gives the TSO's remuneration for each model that comes from the transmission system
operation.
Three zones One zone
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Expected) (Expected) (Expected) (Expected)
41,410 41,196 42,085 51,558 52,444 52,444
Table 10: TSOs/CORESO's remuneration for each case ($) (daily values)
The TSO's remuneration in the coordinated case is higher than in the not-coordinated case because there
is more line congestion. Recall that with the not-coordinated case, the total amount of capacity that has to be
destined to reserve increases because the minimum requirement of conventional reserve goes from 500 MW to
1200 MW. This implies a reduction of the generating capacity to generate electricity and, hence, less transmission
congestion.
6 Conclusions
The non-dispatchability of renewable technologies introduces high uncertainty in the short-term operation.
Reserve procurement represents a key aspect in power systems with high renewable capacity in order to ensure
supply quality to consumers. Therefore, exibility is mentioned as an emerging issue in order to tackle that
variability and one may inquire about the impact of market design on the provision of exibility. In this paper,
three market designs are analyzed, which dier by the stage at which reserve capacity needs are determined.
To analyze the performance of each market, three optimization models are proposed, which take into account
the variability of the demand and the renewable power production in the real-time operation. On top of that,
we analyze the impact of dierent degrees of coordination in reserve procurement on the market eciency. The
conclusions resulting from this study are as follows:
1) Model 1 results to be less ecient than the other two market designs under all assumptions. Due to the
anticipativity of the reserve procurement, the TSO may procure a level of reserves that is much higher than the
amount eectively needed.
2) Model 2, where the co-optimization of energy and reserve is operated by the TSO, is as ecient as Model 3
in the coordinated reserve procurement because it can substantially modify the outcome of the day-ahead energy
market to procure reserve needs. When operating in a not-coordinated case, Model 2 becomes less ecient than
Model 3 because of the imposition of cross-border day-ahead exchange limitations, but still more ecient than
Model 1.
3) As expected, the co-optimized procurement of energy and reserve described by Model 3 is the most ecient
market under all reserve procurement assumptions.
4) In all models, the not-coordinated reserve procurement based on multiple zones leads to higher total
operating costs than considering the power system as a whole. In addition, involuntary unserved demand may
happen in real time due to not being exible enough to counteract the deviations between the day-ahead schedule
and the real-time operation.
5) In the coordinated reserve procurement case, the market is mainly capacity driven since the exibility is
oered as a byproduct of existing capacity. In the not-coordinated case, ramping services play a signicant role.
6) With respect to the operation of generating units, the study of the prots obtained by each technology
shows that CCGT units mostly work as reserve units, increasing their prots in the not-coordinated case.
Additionally, these results provide a policy interpretation. Our case study is indeed conducted on a system that
has ample conventional exible capacity (2650 MW net capacity with 1855 MW/hour of ramping capability for a
peak demand of 3135 MW). Interestingly, the dierent models show that this physically comfortable market can
behave quite dierently for apparently minor modications of market design. The not-coordinated case increases
the operating costs, and the market with physically abundant exible capacities suddenly becomes constrained
in exibility, leading to unserved demand in real time. This reminds of phenomena observed years ago with
congestion phenomena that were supposed to be solved by counter-trading without modifying the commercial
ows. However, similar eects are here observed with the reserve procurement and will probably lead to a
higher impact with the increasing renewable production in an imperfect market design. In fact, the European
Commission and system operators across the US are concerned about increasing the real-time coordination and
that is why they are promoting modications in the regulation. This paper provides a compelling outcome of
the consequences of, rst, having a certain market design, and second, how exible the system is to provide the
reserve capacity needed under high renewable production.
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In other words, our results give numbers to the outcome of the analysis conducted by Neuho et al. (2015)
on reserve procurement that is Reserve pooling across national borders can be an important benet of European
power market integration. In order to achieve this, pricing structure, product design, and timing need to be further
aligned. A closer integration of reserve procurement with short-term energy markets will allow to capture benets
of co-optimization.
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A Model notation
This section lists the notation used in the mathematical formulations.
Indices
f Index of forecast scenarios in day ahead, running from 1 to NF
g Index of generating units, running from 1 to NG
j Index of demands, running from 1 to NJ
l Index of transmission lines, running from 1 to NL
n Index of nodes, running from 1 to NN
s Index of real time scenarios, running from 1 to NS
t Index of time periods, running from 1 to NT
z Index of network zones, running from 1 to NZ
Sets
D(j, n) Set of demands connected to node n
G(g, n) Set of generating units connected to node n
ZD(j, z) Set of demands in zone z
ZG(g, z) Set of generating units in zone z
ΩDi/St Set of dispatchable/stochastic units
Ωf Set of real-time scenarios generated from forecast scenario f
ΩnQ/Q Set of not-qualied/qualied units
Constants and parameters
Bl Susceptance of the line l (p.u.)
CDj Cost of demand deviation ($/MWh)
C
DDR/DUR
gt Cost of deploying down/up reserves of generating unit g in period t ($/MWh)
CGg Generation cost of generating unit g ($/MWh)
CUS Cost of unserved demand ($/MWh)
DFjt Forecasted demand j in period t (MWh)
DRTjts Actual demand j in period t and real time scenario s (MWh)
KU/D Security factor associated with upward/downward deviations of forecast errors (p.u.)
PLmaxl Capacity of the line l (MW)
PGmaxg Capacity of generating unit g (MW)
PRTgts Actual power of stochastic generating unit g in period t and real time scenario s (MWh)
rampdo/upg Down/up ramping limits of generating unit g (MW/h)
∆dmaxjt Maximum deviation of demand j in period t (MWh)
σDjt Standard deviation of the forecasted error of demand j in period t (MW)
σDjtf Standard deviation of the forecasted error of demand j in period t and forecast scenario f (MW)
σStgt Standard deviation of the forecast error of stochastic production of unit g in period t (MW)
ξs Probability of real time scenario s (p.u.)




jt Unserved power for demand j in period t in day ahead (MWh)
dUS
TSO
jt Unserved power for demand j in period t in day ahead in the TSO's Model 2 (MWh)
dUS
RT
jts Unserved power for demand j in period t and real time scenario s (MWh)
pDAgt Power generated in day ahead by generating unit g in period t (MWh)
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pTSOgt Power re-schedule operated by TSO for dispatchable unit g in period t in the day ahead in Model
2 (MWh)
pGgts Power generated in real time by generating unit g in period t and scenario s (MWh)
pLDAlt Power ow through line l in period t in day ahead (MWh)
pLTSOlt Power ow through line l in period t in day ahead in the TSO's Model 2 (MWh)
pLRTlts Power ow through line l in period t and real time scenario s (MWh)
R
D/U
gt Down/up reserve scheduled by generating unit g in period t (MW)
RCgt Reserve for contingencies scheduled by generating unit g in period t (MW)
r
D/U
gts Down/up reserve deployed by generating unit g in period t and real time scenario s (MWh)
∆d
D/U
jts Down/up deviations by demand j in period t and real time scenario s (MWh)
θDAnt Voltage angle at node n in period t in day ahead (rad)
θTSOnt Voltage angle at node n in period t in day ahead in the TSO's Model 2 (rad)
θRTnts Voltage angle at node n in period t and real time scenario s (rad)
Finally, we indicate in parentheses the corresponding dual variable next to each constraint.
B Generating units' prots, consumers' benet, and ISO's remu-
neration
In this section, we present the mathematical expressions used to compute the market agent (generators,
consumers and TSO) prots. In particular, we use the equality between the primal and dual objective function
values of our models to compute the agent prots. The primal problem represents the operation of the energy
market and gives its cost. The dual problem represents the revenue accruing to the agents bringing assets to
their market and the payment for electricity and its quality. Duality theory links the two, making possible to
immediately evaluate the remuneration of the dierent resources (generating capacity, ramping services, DSM)
from the prot realized by operating the system and selling its output at marginal cost.
We here concentrate on Model 1 by rst reporting the objective function of the dual problem associated with
(1)-(28) and then illustrating how the players' remuneration is determined. In particular, the terms composing the
objective function (79) of the dual formulation are used to determine the generating units' prots, the consumers'
benet, and the ISO/TSO's remuneration depending on their economic interpretation. Agents' prots of Model
2 and Model 3 are derived in a similar way.
B.1 Objective function of the dual formulation of Model 1























































































































































































































Using duality theory, we group the terms of the dual objective function to dene the prots as follows. We
rst consider the dierence between the sum of the terms in lambda (λDAntf , λ
RT







and the value of the primal. The former are the consumers' payments for energy and reliability, the latter is the
cost of operation. The dierence between those two values is then the prot made by operating the xed assets
of the system, i.e. capacity and exibility oered by generators and DSM capacity provided by the consumer.
This expression states that the prot made by operating the xed assets is equal to the payment to the owners
of those xed assets when valued at the respective dual prices. This relation is the standard principle of perfect
competition in economics (which is our assumption of price taking agents): the rent paid to the providers of some
resource (in this case the xed assets) is equal to the gross prot made by these assets in the economy. The
underpinning pricing interpretation is that capacity is paid at scarcity rent (the value of an additional unit of the
asset) and the energy and reliability are priced at marginal cost. The rest of the reasoning consists of assigning
the gross prot made on the energy and reliability to the dierent xed assets (capacity, exibility and demand
side) according to the interpretation of the parameters of the right-hand side of the primal.
B.2 Generating units
The prots of the generating units are dierent according to unit type.






















gtf corresponds to the expected remuneration of the unit from the capacity
used to provide energy and reserve for the set of day-ahead forecasts. The term is the product between
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the unit generation capacity PGmaxg and the scarcity rent κ
U











doκrDgtf correspond to the expected remuneration
of upward and downward ramping services (ramping capacity), respectively. Note that κrUgtf and κ
rD
gtf are
the economic values of upward/downward exibility.












∀g ∈ ΩnQ (81)
where µgtf is the scarcity rent and corresponds to the dual variable of capacity constraint (11), while µ
rU
gtf
and µrDgtf are the dual variables of the ramping constraints (12) and (13) respectively. As for the qualied
units, the rst term of the prots' formula denes the capacity remuneration, while the other two the
ramping capacity remuneration.





g µgtf , where µgtf is the dual variable of constraint (11) with g ∈ ΩSt. These revenues






gts τgts to account for the actual production and















gts τgts ∀g ∈ ΩSt (82)
B.3 Consumers
The consumers' group pays for: 1) the energy service and 2) the reliability provided by the scheduled reserves.
Then, consumers' benet is dened as their willingness to pay for the service minus what they eectively pay as

































































































· ηCzt, ∀j ∈ D(j, n) (83)
1) The energy service is evaluated as the sum of the consumers' willingness to pay (in the usual sense of welfare
economics when demand is xed) and the value of the capacity oered for DSM services minus the cost of
buying energy in day ahead and the net value of demand schedule deviations between day ahead and real
time.











jt appearing in the rst line of (83). Since
demand is exogenous, we identify the maximum electricity price that consumers are willing to pay in
the value of the unexpected unserved demand that is CUS . The price CUS is multiplied by the actual
demand in real time DRTjts corrected by the ∆d
max
jt that is the maximum demand deviation operated by
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consumers in real time when providing DSM services. Due the dierent consumers' valuation between






jt is evaluated at C
D
jt instead
of CUS . Finally, note that these two terms composing the willingness to pay do not directly appear
in (79).
 Remuneration of demand side management services. The consumers' remuneration for the









jts) is the revenue for providing DSM service from the xed amount
∆dmaxjt . Following a reasoning similar to that applied for generating units, the remuneration for this
services is obtained by multiplying ∆dmaxjt by the dual variables associated with constraints (27) and
(28), whose value identify the remuneration for DSM.
 Cost of purchasing energy in day ahead and deviation between day ahead and real time.








ntf , where D
F
jtf is
the demand for forecast f and λDAntf is the dual variable of the energy balance (5), which corresponds
to the electricity price in day ahead. This represents a forward purchase because there is no delivery






jtfψjtf from constraint (10) that
imposes bounds on the unserved demand in day ahead. Note that ψjtf has a positive value when (10)
is binding, i.e., when the unserved demand in day ahead is equal to the demand forecast DFjtf , which
is a very extreme situation.







(DRTjts − DFjtf )λRTnts represents the evaluation of
the deviation between the demand forecast DFjtf in day ahead and the actual demand D
RT
jts in the
real-time scenario associated with forecast f . In this case, λRTnts is the dual variable associated with









jts that is obtained from constraint (26). As for the day ahead, this
term describes the situation where the unserved demand in real time equals the real-time demand,
corrected by possible deviation due to DSM. Again, this is a very exceptional situation.
2) The system reliability provided by reserves represents a cost that is charged to consumers in order to ensure
the supply quality. The system reliability is evaluated by the last three terms of (83), where the amounts




zt of the respective reserve need




zt identify the reserve
value.
B.4 The ISO















































The ISO is remunerated for the use of its infrastructures. Its remuneration is obtained from the economic
interpretation of the dual variables associated with the transmission constraints in day ahead and in real time.
The rst two terms of (84) refer to the day ahead and descend from constraints (7) and (8). These addends have
the interpretation of transmission rights, but we do not discuss about them in this paper. The other two terms
derive from constraints (20) and (21) and represent the remuneration of the network utilization in real time.
C Input data
This section discusses the input data used for our case study. In particular, we consider a case study based
on the IEEE 24-node Reliability Test System (RTS).18 The example comprises 17 demands and 38 transmission
lines. The peak electricity demand is equal to 3135 MW and the technical characteristics of the transmission
system are taken from the original network provided in Reliability Test System Task Force. Figure 7 depicts a
schema of the system and the distribution of the generation units. We assume that the availability factors of the
18Reliability Test System Task Force (1999). The IEEE reliability test system-1996, IEEE Transaction on Power Systems,
14(3),1010-1020.
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nuclear, coal and CCGT units are equal to 1 in order to simplify the discussion. Availability factors of wind and
solar PV units are dependent on the scenarios. For space limitations, we do not provide those data.
Technology Unit Node Capacity Ramping rate Variable cost
# # (MW) (pu) ($/MWh)
CCGT 1 1 300 0.70 55
CCGT 2 2 250 0.70 56
Coal 3 7 300 0.70 35
CCGT 4 15 400 0.70 50
Coal 5 16 300 0.70 36
CCGT 6 21 300 0.70 52
CCGT 7 22 400 0.70 53
CCGT 8 23 400 0.70 54
Nuclear 9 12 500 0.05 12
Table 11: Characteristics of the dispatchable generation units
The generation system comprises one nuclear (N), two coal (CO), six CCGT, six wind (W), and four solar PV
(PV) plants. Table 11 reports the data associated with the dispatchable units: location, variable cost, capacity,
and ramping rates. Conventional units are run in merit order on the basis of their variable (fuel) costs. We
consider that the ramping rate of both CCGT and coal units is equal to 0.7. We assume a warm start for coal
units since they mostly work as base units. For CCGT units, even though it is technically possible for them to































Figure 7: IEEE 24-node RTS.
The total generating capacity of the system is 6000 MW. Wind units have a capacity of 400 MW and 300
MW, respectively. The four solar PV units have capacities of 200 MW and 150 MW, respectively. Thus, the
capacity per technology is distributed as follows: 2050 MW (34%) of CCGT, 600 MW (10%) of coal, 500 MW
(8%) of nuclear, 2100 MW (35%) of wind, and 750 MW (12.5%) of solar PV. As customary in power systems
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with high share of stochastic units, the generation system is oversized with respect to the peak demand. In our
case, the rate generating capacity/peak demand is 1.91.
As explained in Section 2.1, the available renewable production in each node and at each hour is an uncertain
parameter modeled through scenarios. The scenario generation process is detailed in D.
Consumer's demands are indicated by an arrow in Figure 7. Demand proles can vary by zone. As for
stochastic generation, nodal demand is exogenous and represented via scenarios as described in D. Unserved
demand is priced at 10,000 $/MWh, and up/down demand deviations in real time are priced between 89 $/MWh
and 93.2 $/MWh, being dierent among demands to avoid multiple solutions with the same objective function
value.
All cases have been solved using CPLEX 12.6.3.0 (http://www.ilog.com/products/cplex/) under GAMS
24.6.1 on a Intel(R) Core(TM) 1.30 GHz processor with 4 GB RAM.
D Scenario generation
This section describes the scenario generation process. Our calibration is based on historical hourly data of
the ERCOT power system.19 We rely on historical data of the demand, wind speed and solar irradiation from
several locations in Texas available from NREL (2015) in the System Advisor Model.20 These data correspond to
a typical meteorological year. We calibrate the short-term operating models on a Wednesday (D) in June.
Since in this analysis the uncertainty on the day-ahead and the balancing markets is taken into account,
we generate demand, wind and solar scenarios for both stages. We refer to forecast scenarios to the scenarios
considered in the day-ahead market, and to real-time scenarios to those for the balancing market. Three forecast
scenarios and thirty real-time scenarios are generated.
First, the steps followed to generate the forecast scenarios are enumerated below:
• Demand level. Assuming that the variation of the hourly demand curve in a day of two consecutive weeks
is comparatively low, we consider the actual demand level on the previous Wednesday (D-7) as the central
prediction for the delivery day (D). Thus, we construct three forecast scenarios around this central prediction
using a normal distribution with mean equal to the central prediction (D-7), and standard deviation equal
to 5% Forecast scenarios are dierent among the three zones in which the network is divided.
• Solar power availability. To generate solar power scenarios, we assume low variability of the solar
irradiation among consecutive days. We use historical data corresponding to the week before the day-ahead
market (D-8), i.e., we consider a set of 168 values corresponding to the hours of a week. The procedure
to generate the scenarios is as follows: rst, the historical data are normalized using the maximum value
among the considered set of hours, consequently, these values give an idea of the solar power availability
in each hour; second, the mean over each hour of the day is computed; third, the solar power availability
scenarios are generated using a normal distribution with mean equal to the mean value of the historical
data and a standard deviation of 5% of the mean value. Three forecast scenarios per zone are generated.
• Wind power availability. The wind forecast scenarios are generated as follows:
 We use historical data of the hourly wind speed of four locations corresponding to the week before
(D-8) of the day-ahead market.
 The next step consists on characterize the wind speed in each location. To do that, rst we analyze
whether there is spatial correlation among the wind speed data. If there is spatial correlation among
the locations, it will be taken into account further to generate the scenarios.
 Second, we use computational tools to obtain the parameters that dene the Weibull distribution of
the wind speed in each location, and then the Weibull cumulative distribution function. The resulting
values are tted into a normal distribution using the inverse cumulative distribution function.
 Third, an ARMA model is generated per location using the data obtained in the previous step.
 Fourth, we generate forecast error scenarios assuming a white noise distribution. Then, we use the
ARMA model and the forecast error scenarios to generate the forecast wind scenarios. At this step,
we obtain scenarios of the wind speed in each location for 24 hours.
 Finally, we apply the power curve of a wind turbine21 to transform the m/s to MW. Then, the
production of a wind turbine is multiplied by the number of turbines comprising the wind farm to
obtain the total wind power available.
19The Electric Reliability Council of Texas http://www.ercot.com
20NREL-National Renewable Energy Laboratory (2015). Alliance for Sustainable Energy (Alliance), Department of
Energy (DOE). Solar Advisor Model version 2015.1.30.
21Source: Danish Wind Industry Association, Wind Turbine Power Calculator[Online]. Available at http://www.
windpower.org
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Note that the demand level and the solar power availability are in per unit. Therefore, to obtain the con-
sumption in MWh in each node, we multiply the per unit factor by the maximum demand level in each node
(these data are available in Reliability Test System Task Force, 1999). Similarly, the available solar power results
from multiplying the availability factor in each scenario times the unit capacity.
Second, real-time scenarios for the balancing market are generated regarding the forecast scenarios. Ten
real-time scenarios are generated for each forecast scenario. The procedure is described bellow.
• Demand level and solar power availability. Real-time scenarios of both demand level and solar power
availability are generated in the same way. Real-time scenarios are generated using a normal distribution
with mean equal to the corresponding value of the forecast scenario in each hour, and a standard deviation
equal to 1% of mean value. Consequently, 30 dierent values per hour (3 forecast scenarios times 10 real-
time scenarios) are obtained. As with the forecast scenarios, the per unit values are transformed into actual
quantities.
• Wind power availability. To generate real-time wind power scenarios, we apply the approach described in
Pineda and Morales (2016), which is based on assuming that the forecast error follows a beta distribution
with zero mean and standard deviation depending on the wind power prediction (Fabbri et al., 2005).
Therefore, we express the standard deviation of the forecast error distributions of the real-time scenarios as
a linear function of the value of the corresponding forecast scenario in each hour. The resulting real-time
scenarios provide the wind power available in each hour and each node of the network.
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